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Application and Constitutionality of the Revised
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
Divorce, coupled with the departure of the supporting spouse from
the jurisdiction, creates the problem of obtaining and enforcing support
orders in favor of the dependent spouse or child. Because of the increase
of the incidence of divorce in the United States' and because of the in-
creased mobility of Americans, the difficulties in obtaining and enforcing
these support orders have gained wide recognition in recent years. A
dependent spouse may have difficulty in obtaining and enforcing a sup-
port order or in enforcing a preexisting order because of the difficulty of
acquiring jurisdiction over an obligor 2 who resides outside of the jurisdic-
tion in which the dependent is present.3 Traditionally, the dependent
spouse can utilize the U.S. legal system to enforce rights of support in
two ways. One solution is for the obligee to hire an attorney in the juris-
diction where the obligor is present and to travel to that forum to bring
the action. This tactic is often unavailable because the obligee lacks the
necessary financial resources. Another remedy provided is criminal pros-
ecution. The obligor can be extradited and tried on criminal charges of
non-support. This, however, leads to what has been termed a "classic
'Catch-22 situation,' -4 because the convicted obligor cannot earn money
while in jail and the stigma of the conviction may reduce the future em-
ployment opportunities. The probability that the obligee would receive
I Se Norton & Glick, Marital Instabioiy in Amerca: Past, Present, and Future, in DIVORCE
AND SEPARATION 6 (1979).
2 The terms obligor and obligee will be used throughout the paper to indicate the two
primary parties involved. The terms are defined by the REVISED UNIFORM RECIPROCAL EN-
FORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT (1968), reprinted in 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 643-746 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as RURESA] as follows:
"Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support or against whom a proceed-
ing for the enforcement of a duty of support or registration of a support order is
commenced.
RURESA § 2(g).
"Obligee" means a person including a State or political subdivision to whom a
duty of support is owed or a person including a State or political subdivision that
has commenced a proceeding for enforcement of an alleged duty of support or for
registration of a support order. It is immaterial if the person to whom a duty of
support owed is a recipient of public assistance.
Id. § 2(0.
3 DeHart, Child Support Enforcement: Reaching Across Inteinational Boundaries, FAM. ADvO-
CATE, Fall 1979, at 26.
4 See Note, Uni/rm Reciprocal Legislation to Enforce Familial Dutis fSupport, 25 DRAKE L.
REV. 206, 208 (1975).
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future support payments is practically nonexistent.5 The limitations of
these two methods have left many dependent spouses without a remedy.
In response to the need for an alternative effective and practical
method of enforcing support orders against absent obligors, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws6 and the American
Bar Association approved the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup-
port Act (URESA) in 1950. 7 The 1950 URESA procedures allowed the
obligee to institute an action in her own domicile, the initiating state,
that would then permit the court with jurisdiction in the obligor's domi-
cile, the responding state, to obtain jurisdiction over him. After a de
novo hearing conducted pursuant to the law of the responding state, an
order of support could then be entered and enforced against the obligor
in the responding state. The obligee was not required to retain counsel
in the responding state or to appear at the hearing in order to obtain
relief.8
In 1958, the URESA was amended 9 to address the problem of en-
forcement of preexisting support orders.' 0 These amendments required
the clerk of court to maintain a Registry of Foreign Support Orders for
registration of support orders filed by a court of a state having URESA
or similar legislation." Jurisdiction over the obligor was obtained by
usual civil procedures, and a hearing was held to resolve the matter.
Upon confirmation of the order by the court of the responding state or
upon the default of the obligor, which results in automatic confirmation,
the foreign support order would be effective as if it had been originally
entered in the court of the responding state. ' 2 This procedure is basically
a simplified method of applying the full faith and credit doctrine to the
support orders of a foreign state, with the hearing confined to examina-
tion of any defense which would be available to the defendant if the
support order had been entered in the responding state.' 3
5 Id.
6 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was formed to pro-
mote uniformity in state laws. It is composed of Commissioners from each state who are mem-
bers of the legal profession. The Commissioners meet annually to discuss tentative drafts and
approve and amend Uniform Acts. Acts approved by the National Conference are submitted to
the American Bar Association for approval and are promulgated for adoption by the states. 9A
UNIFORM LAWS ANN. III, IV (1979). William J. Brockelbank was a member and later Chair-
man of the Special Committee of the National Conference which drafted the URESA and its
amendments, with much of the drafting being done by Brockelbank. See W. BROCKELBANK,
INTERSTATE ENFORCEMENT OF FAMILY SUPPORT (THE RUNAWAY PAPPY ACT) (2d ed. 1971).
7 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS 123, 171 (1950) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK (1950)].
8 UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT §§ 7-20 (1950) [hereinafter
cited as URESA (1950)]. The Act is set out in full in HANDBOOK (1950), supra note 7, at 175-80.
9 See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 241-52 (1958) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK (1958)].
10 See UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT §§ 33-38 (1958).
11 Id. § 35.
12 Id. §§ 37-38.
13 Id.
SUPPORT ACT APPLICATION
The URESA underwent a major revision in 1968, with seven new
sections added and many changes made in the existing sections. The Act
as amended was retitled the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act (RURESA).' 4 One of the important changes was the provi-
sion for international enforcement of support orders. Section 2(m) of the
Act defines "state" to include a "State, territory or possession of the
United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, and any foreign jurisdiction in which this or a substantially similar
reciprocal law is in effect."' 5 This amendment was adopted in response
to the increasing incidence of the "multinational family,"' 6 which occurs
when members of what was originally a nuclear family separate and
move to different countries. The typical situation involves a military
man who fathers a child in another country and then returns to his na-
tive country.
Originally the goal of the Commissioners was to enable states to es-
tablish reciprocity with Canada, 1 7 a favorite haven of fleeing obligors.
States, however, are utilizing the provision to establish receiprocity with
a number of countries.' 8 These reciprocal arrangements allow a depen-
dent spouse to enforce a support order in his or her favor relatively sim-
ply, despite the fact that the obligor has fled the country.
The Commissioners considered and rejected the alternative of estab-
lishing a treaty between the United States and Canada to accomplish
their purpose. This idea was rejected for two reasons: 1) the Commission
did not want to facilitate the movement of the federal government into
the area of domestic relations; and 2) it was believed that the State De-
partment would reject the proposal since no national power was in-
volved. 19 Both reasons relate to the traditional view that domestic
relations are the concern of the individual states with regulation power
reserved to them by the tenth amendment. However, when matters of
state concern take on an international scope, federal law may intervene
14 See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 223-37 (1968); 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 643-746 (1979).
15 RURESA § 2(m). In 1975, North Carolina adopted the RURESA definition of "state"
without change. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52A-3(13) (1976). The wording of the definition of "state"
in the earlier versions of URESA was as follows: " 'state' includes any state, territory or posses-
sion of the United States and the District of Columbia in which this or a substantially similar
reciprocal law has been enacted." URESA (1950) § 2(a).
16 DeHart, supra note 3,at 27.
17 Sr, W. BROCKELBANK, supra note 6, at 98.
18 For example, California has established reciprocity with the Republic of South Africa,
Australia, West Germany, and England, as well as with twelve Canadian provinces. DeHart,
supra note 3, at 27-28.
19 W. J. BROCKELBANK, supra note 6, at 91. A United Nations treaty was adopted in 1956
which establishes a RURESA-type procedure for international enforcement of support orders.
United Nations Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance, done on June 20, 1956,
268 U.N.T.S. 32. The United States has never ratified this treaty. DeHart, supra note 3, at 29.
DeHart believes ratification of the treaty would be desirable because it would "enormously
increase our capabilities for dealing with enforcement problems, since outside the Common-
wealth system, there is no formal system of reciprocity based on comity." Id.
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and preempt state law if the matter has become one involving foreign
policy or other areas controlled by the federal government. 20 In the case
of international reciprocal enforcement of support orders, the Commis-
sioners felt the matter was still of primarily local concern which should




RURESA was envisioned as a method of enforcing support orders
which could be utilized by all obligees. Therefore, the procedure in-
volved in RURESA actions is simple and basically clerical, as an exami-
nation of its use in North Carolina demonstrates. Both intrastate and
interstate actions are governed by the same provisions. The action is ini-
tiated "by the issuance of summons in the form required for actions for
alimony without divorce by the court having jurisdiction. '22 A verified
complaint must be filed stating the name and address of the defendant, if
known, his circumstances, and the names of the dependents for whom
support is sought.23 The North Carolina statute also contains a non-obli-
gatory suggestion that other information which could help locate and
identify the defendant be included, such as photographs, social security
numbers, and fingerprints. 24
The North Carolina court must certify the action for transfer to the
court of another jurisdiction upon the finding of three requisite facts: 1)
that the defendant is not presently in North Carolina; 2) that the allega-
tions of the complaint state facts which would be sufficient for a finding
that the defendant has a duty of support; and 3) that jurisdiction over
the defendant could be obtained by the responding court. 25 If these
three findings are made, the certification must be made and the North
Carolina court has the duty to send three copies of the complaint, the
court's certificate, and any other documents filed to the court or other
responsible agency of the responding state. 26 Additionally a copy of
North Carolina General Statute Chapter 52A, the URESA, must be pro-
vided. 27
One of the most important provisions of the North Carolina
20 See text accompanying notes 77-108 infra.
21 DeHart states that this premise is no longer valid. DeHart, supra note 3, at 29. She
points to the enactment of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act which provides funding for a
program to aid in enforcement of support for both welfare and non-welfare obligees. The Office
of Child Support Enforcement, an HEW agency, administers the program. Id.




26 Id. § 52A- It.
27 Id. The duties required by this section are the responsiblity of the clerk of superior
court unless otherwise directed by the chief district court judge. Id.
SUPPORT ACT APPLICATION
URESA is the provision for legal representation for the obligee in the
responding state, which states
(i) It shall be the duty of the official who prosecutes criminal actions
for the State in the court acquiring jurisdiction to appear on behalf of
the obligee in proceedings under this Chapter. In the event of an appeal
from a support order entered under this Chapter, the Attorney General
shall represent the obligee.28
Thus, the obligee, who is often without financial resources, is assured of
having an attorney represent her at the hearing in the responding state.
This provision greatly enhances the value of URESA since the lack of a
legal representative in the responding state and the inability of the obli-
gee to personally appear are the basic problems with other remedies.
The 1975 amendment of the North Carolina URESA also allows the ob-
ligee to be represented by the prosecuting attorney in the state in the
initial proceeding upon either the request of the initiating court or the
request to the court by the county director of public services if the person
or his family is receiving public assistance.
29
Under North Carolina's URESA, the effective enforcement of sup-
port orders30 depends on the responding state. Thus, a resident of Onta-
rio, a jurisdiction with substantially similar legislation, who seeks support
from a North Carolina resident must rely upon the courts of North Caro-
lina to enter an order of support if one has not been previously obtained,
and to enforce it. 3 1 For example, upon receipt of the documents de-
scribed in section 52-11, the North Carolina court will set the cause for
hearing, give notice to the prosecuting attorney who will represent the
obligee, set a time and place for hearing, and take the necessary actions
to obtain jurisdiction over the obligor. 32 The responding state also has
the duty of locating the obligor or his property. This duty must be ful-
filled with diligence, requesting additional information from the initiat-
ing court if necessary.33 If the prosecuting attorney finds that the obligor
or his property are within another jurisdiction, he must forward all docu-
ments received to that jurisdiction. 34
28 Id. § 52A-10.1.
29 Id. § 52A-10.3. The statute also provides that, in counties having a special county attor-
ney for social services, he or she shall represent the obligee. Id. The wording of this section is
different from the analogous RURESA provision. See RURESA § 12.
The constitutionality of this section can be questioned on two grounds. First, as a denial of
equal protection because the same right to free legal service is denied in actions where both
obligor and obligee are in the-same state, and second, as an invalid use of public funds for the
benefit of a private individual. One court has rejected these contentions on the basis of the
underlying public policy purposes of a similar provision of the former Uniform Support of De-
pendents Act. Se. Duncan v. Smith, 262 S.W.2d 373, 378 (Ky. 1953).
30 The phrase "enforcement of support orders" as used throughout this article, unless
otherwise indicated, applies to both the procedure of obtaining and enforcing a support order in
the responding court and to the enforcement of a preexisting order, obtained in another juris-
diction, in the responding court.
31 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52A-12 to -16 (1976).
32 Id. § 52A-12.
33 Id. § 52A-12.1(a).
34 Id. § 52A-12.1(b).
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The petitioner in a URESA action is required to prove by legally
permissible evidence that the respondent has a duty of support. 35 Sec-
tion 12.2 of the North Carolina Act provides for continuance of the hear-
ing for the submission of additional evidence if the obligee does not
appear and the obligor denies the allegations or if the obligor presents
evidence in his defense. The statute provides that the evidence may be
presented by deposition or personal testimony. 36 The husband-wife priv-
ilege is made specifically inapplicable to URESA actions .3  Evidence in
URESA actions, unlike usual civil proceedings, consists primarily of such
secondary evidence as depositions and interrogatories. 38 After hearing
all the evidence the court of the responding state determines whether the
defendant has a duty of support. If it finds in the affirmative, "it may
order the defendant to furnish support or reimbursement therefor and
subject the property of the defendant to such order."'39 Copies of the
support order are then sent to the initiating court.40 The initiating court
has the duty to receive and disburse all payments received from the de-
fendant or the responding court. 4 1
The North Carolina URESA has an important provision designed
to facilitate the effective use of the Act. Section 24 designates the State
Division of Social Services as the state information agency under
URESA. The state information agency is required to compile a list of all
courts and their addresses in North Carolina which have jurisdiction
under URESA and provide the information to the information agencies
of states who have adopted URESA or a substantially similar act.42 The
agency is likewise required to receive all such lists submitted from other
states and transmit copies of them to all North Carolina courts with juris-
diction under URESA.4 3 Finally, the state information agency must for-
ward to any North Carolina court with jurisdiction over an obligor
complaints, petitions, certificates, and copies of other acts it receives from
the information agencies or courts of other states.44
The basic RURESA rules and procedures apply to the international
enforcement of support orders. By adopting the RURESA definition of
"state" the state legislature goes beyond the concept of comity, which is a
discretionary recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and
35 See Carpenter v. Carpenter, 231 La. 638, 92 So. 2d 393 (1956).
36 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52A-12.2 (1976).
37 Id. at § 52A-18.
381 Note, The Uniform Recsprocal Enforcement of Support Act. Procedural Problems and a Technologi-
cal Solution, 41 TEMP. L.Q. 325, 327 (1968). The author argues that the secondary evidence
presently used is inadequate for proper adjudication of support matters. He suggests that by
using modern technology, such as videotaping, the effectiveness of URESA actions could be
enhanced. Id. at 327, 333.
39 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52A-13 (1976).
40 Id. § 52A- 14.
41 Id. § 52A-17.
42 Id. § 52A-24(1).
43 Id. § 52A-24(2).
44 Id. § 52A-24(3).
SUPPORT ACT APPLICATION
claims by domestic courts, to provide access to the courts of North Caro-
lina for foreign residents to obtain and enforce support orders pursuant
to the statute.45 However, the establishment of reciprocity between a
state and a foreign country and the actual working of the procedure are
more difficult in practice than the simple wording of the RURESA pro-
vision suggests. There are three significant matters that must be resolved
before RURESA can apply: 1) it must be established that the support
laws of the foreign country are substantially similar to RURESA; 2) ac-
comodations for insubstantial differences between the two procedures
must be worked out; and, 3) a procedure for handling the international
cases, including designation of the officials who will process the necessary
actions, must be established.
The North Carolina experience with RURESA in the international
context provides an example of typical problems encountered in the
area. Currently North Carolina enjoys reciprocity with two jurisdic-
tions--Ontario, Canada and West Germany.46 Pursuant to these "loose
working arrangements, ' 4 7 North Carolina residents may obtain and en-
force support decrees in the courts of these jurisdictions. Likewise, West
Germans and residents of Ontario may utilize the courts of North Caro-
lina to reach obligors present in the state.48 Although the laws of North
Carolina and these two foreign jurisdictions have been declared substan-
tially similar as required by RURESA, there are differences in concepts
and procedures which remain.
The first difference between North Carolina and Ontario laws con-
cerns the underlying concept of support legislation. Under U.S. theory,
RURESA is used to enforce an obligation of duty to support, whereas in
Canada the Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance Act (REMOA)49 is
used to enforce a provisional support order.50 In actions not concerned
45 Id. § 52A-3(13).
46 Interview with Henry Burgwyn, Associate Attorney General for the State of North Car-
olina, in Raleigh, North Carolina (Feb. 22, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Burgwyn Interview].
This seemingly odd combination is more a result of the desire of those two jurisdictions to
establish reciprocity with states in the United States than a singling out of them by North
Carolina. Negotiations with other sovereigns, such as England and the Canadian provinces of
Manitoba and New Brunswick, are in progress. Id.
47 This is the terminology used by Mr. Burgwyn to avoid suggestion of the constitutional
problems encountered by use of the term "agreement." Id See text accompanying notes 77-108
infta.
48 During the three years in which North Carolina has had reciprocity with Ontario, only
six cases have been transmitted from North Carolina to Ontario and very few have been trans-
mitted from Ontario to North Carolina. It is anticipated, however, that the North Carolina-
West Germany arrangement will be used much more extensively. West Germany sent five cases
to North Carolina even before reciprocity was declared. Burgwyn Interview, supra note 46.
49 RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF MAINTENANCE ACT §§ 1-14 (Ontario 1959), reprinted
in W. BROCKELBANK, supra note 6, at 167-74 [hereinafter cited as REMOA].
50 Memorandum to the Honorable L.R. McTavish, Q.C., Uniform Law Commission for
the Province of Ontario, from W.J. Brockelbank, Uniform Law Commissioner for the State of
Idaho, Chairman of the Special Committee on the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act for the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Aug. 20, 1963)
[hereinafter cited as Memorandum].
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with preexisting orders, the initiating court in North Carolina in effect
certifies that the petitioner has a valid complaint and transmits the ac-
tion to the attorney general in Canada who then forwards it to the
proper officer of the Canadian court.5 1 Section 12 of REMOA allows the
court to treat the URESA petition as a provisional order. The Canadian
court then issues a summons against the obligor, holds a hearing on the
evidence if the defendant appears, then enters an order of confirmation,
which is the enforceable order of support.52 In contrast to this proce-
dure, the initiating court in Ontario actually issues a provisional order
which is forwarded to the responding court for confirmation and enforce-
ment.53 The responding court in North Carolina then proceeds as if the
provisional order was a standard URESA complaint.5 4 Therefore, prac-
tically speaking, the effect of each procedure is identical.
A second difference lies in the Canadian and American provisions
for determining what law will be applied at the hearing in the court of
the responding state. The North Carolina URESA provides:
Duties of support applicable under this Chapter are those imposed or
imposable under the laws of any state where the obligor was present
during the period for which support is sought. The obligor is presumed
to have been present in the responding state during the period for which
support is sought until otherwise shown.
55
Thus, North Carolina law will apply to actions transmitted by the
31 REMOA § 2.
52 Id. § 5(l)-(3). The action may be remitted to the initiating court for the taking of fur-
ther evidence. Id. § 5(4). Section 12 of REMOA provides:
Where a maintenance order sought to be registered in a court in Ontario or a
provisional order sought to be confirmed by the court in Ontario under this Act,
or any accompanying document uses terminology different from the terminology
used in Ontario, the difference shall not vitiate any proceeding under this Act.
RURESA does not contain an analogous provision, although Brockelbank has stated such an
amendment should be adopted. Memorandum, note 50 supra.
53 Section 4(1) of REMOA states:
Where an application is made to a court in Ontario for a maintenance order and
it is proved to the court in Ontario that the person against whom the order was
made is resident in a reciprocating state, the court in Ontario may, in the absence
of that person and without service of notice on him, if after hearing the evidence
it is satisfied of the justice of the application, make any maintenance order that it
might have made if a summons had been duly served on that person and he had
failed to appear at the hearing, but an order so made is provisional only and has no effect
until it is confirmed by a court in the reciprocating state (emphasis added).
54 There is no constitutional problem with the North Carolina courts recognizing the pro-
visional order and treating it as a complaint since it is not an order in the sense of having force
and finality. Brockelbank has suggested that REMOA be amended to provide a definition of
"provisional order" to facilitate reciprocity between the United States and Canada. He has
offered the following as an example of what is needed:
In this Act, 'provisional order' means a statement issued by a court of the prov-
ince where complaint has been made to the effect that the defendant named in
the complaint is ordered to pay to the plaintiff a certain amount but with a state-
ment that this order shall have no force and effect until confirmed by a court of
competent jurisdiction where the defendant is residing.
Memorandum, note 50 supra. This suggestion has not yet been followed by the Canadian legis-
lature.
55 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52A-8 (1976).
SUPPORT ACT APPLICATION
Canadian court to the responding North Carolina court. The Canadian
Act, however, applies the law of the initiating state.56 As one authority
notes, this may give the obligor some room to maneuver in instances
where the jurisdictions differ on matters such as recognizing different
ages of majority which cut off the right to support. 5 7 The provision thus
produces a circular effect: Ontario as respondent applies North Carolina
law which in turn applies the law of the responding state, Ontario. A
suggested solution to this problem is applying the choice of law provi-
sions only to substantive laws, not conflicts of laws provisions. 58
Ontario's application of the law of the initiating state leads to a sec-
ond conceptual difficulty.5 9 REMOA requires that the court of the initi-
ating state provide a list of the defenses to the action which the
defendant could have raised if the respondent had been a party to the
action in the initiating state.60 The obvious problem with this procedure
is that the defendant must rely on the initiating court to do a thorough
job of stating his defenses because he has no opportunity under REMOA
to proffer alternate viable defenses. 61 However, in practice this require-
ment has not been a problem. Standardized forms stating all defenses
available under North Carolina law are typically used, eliminating the
prejudice to the defendant of an incomplete or poorly drafted list.62 Ad-
ditionally, the Canadian judge may allow the defendant to offer defenses
not on the list. 63
An entirely different problem arises in dealing with West Germany.
There is a basic impediment to reciprocity in West Germany's lack of
reciprocal enforcement of support act. 64 The applicable German stat-
56 REMOA § 5(2).
57 W.J. BROCKELBANK, supra note 6, at 96-97. For example, if minority ended at age
eighteen in Ontario, and at age twenty-one in the American state, a petitioner in Ontario would
be unsuccessful in obtaining a provisional order of support because no duty would exist, but the
petitioner in the United States would be able to obtain support from a respondent in Ontario
for three additional years with the help of the Canadian court. Id.
58 Id. at 98.
59 Memorandum, note 50 supra.
60 REMOA § 4(1)(i).
61 Memorandum, note 50 supra.
62 The standard North Carolina form lists possible defenses to a support action in a North
Carolina court as:
1. The Court has no jurisdiction to make the order; or
2. The matter of the Complaint is not true; or
3. There is no valid marriage subsisting between the Petitioner and the Respon-
dent (inapplicable if Petitioner is not the wife of Respondent); or
4. Under a decree or order of a competent Court, the Petitioner is already enti-
tled to maintenance for the dependent(s), and such decree is being complied
with; or
5. The Respondent is not of sufficient means or ability to maintain the depen-
dent child(ren); or
6. The child(ren) being over the age of -and not being engaged in a course of
education or training, no provision in respect of the child(ren) can be in-
cluded in the Order.
63 Brockelbank reports that all Canadian judges he had spoken with would allow the de-
fendant to prove any valid defense even if it was not on the list. Memorandum, note 50 supra.
64 DeHart, supra note 3, at 29.
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utes are scattered throughout the Civil Code, the Code of Civil Proce-
dure, and the Criminal Code.65  This was the apparent reason a
Minnesota district court, in Nicol v. Tanner,66 concluded that West Ger-
many did not have a law substantially similar to RURESA. In Nicol the
plaintiff was a German resident and the defendant was a U.S. citizen
who had been a serviceman stationed in West Germany. The plaintiff
obtained a default judgment against the defendant in Germany from a
court with jurisdiction over him, establishing paternity and imposing a
duty of support.6 7 No payments were ever made by the defendant, who
subsequently returned to the United States, where the plaintiff brought
suit to enforce judgment. The district court held that no reciprocity with
West Germany existed and that reciprocity was a prerequisite to recogni-
tion of a foreign judgment. The case was appealed to the Minnesota
Supreme Court which reversed, not on the ground that there was reci-
procity, but because it was not a requirement for recognition of the judg-
ment. 68 It is unclear from the opinion whether the lower court action
was brought under RURESA originally, but the Minnesota court noted
that the parties did not address the applicability of RURESA and that
"it appears to be inapplicable."'69 The court then stated that
if the Federal Republic of Germany had such a substantially similar law,
then it might be required to enforce the contested judgment pursuant to
the Minnesota Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. However, re-
search has not disclosed any such reciprocal law in the Federal Republic
(Fred B. Rotham & Co. trans. Forrester, Ilgen and Goren 1972). 7 0
The court also stated the judgment could be enforced under the doctrine
of res judicata and adopted the test of enforcing a foreign judgment if the
defendant could and should have appeared and litigated the issues in the
foreign court. 7 ' Therefore, the action was remanded to the district court
to determine if the circumstances of the judgment justified its enforce-
ment by the U.S. court. 72
Although the Nicol court held the judgment potentially enforceable,
the many practical problems, such as lengthy procedures, dual hearings,
and the expense of hiring counsel for enforcement proceedings, left many
foreign obligees without a realistic method of redress in Minnesota. An
examination of the German statutes coupled with knowledge of West
65 Certified translation of West German support provisions transmitted to Gloria F. De-
Hart, Deputy Attorney General, State of California, from Dr. Bohmer, Ministerialrat, Federal
Ministry of Justice of West Germany, (November 23, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Translation]. A
summary of the German law and procedures was sent to all IV-D directors and state informa-
tion agents in all states. DeHart, supra note 3, at 29.
66 256 N.W.2d 796 (Minn. 1976).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 803.
69 Id. at 797 n. 1.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 803 (citing Peterson, Foreign CowdyJudgmentt and the Second Restatement of Conflicts of
Laws, 72 CoL. L. REV. 221, 245 (1972)).
72 Id.
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Germany's interest in the area compels the conclusion that RURESA
should have been applied to the action. Whereas the West German
Code of Civil Procedure lists several bases for refusing recognition of a
foreign judgment, 73 the applicable exclusion for most RURESA actions
is the absence of guaranteed reciprocity.74 Minnesota had adopted the
RURESA definition of states, which extends its coverage to obligees in
jurisdictions in which "a substantially similar law is in effect." The pro-
visions of the West German law impose duties of support similar to those
imposed by U.S. states. The North Carolina Attorney General reached
this conclusion in an opinion which stated,
the support laws there are substantially similar to those which exist in
North Carolina, in fact often are broader than our own . . . . The
amount of support is determined by financial need of the child and the
ability of the parent to pay. Foreign orders establishing paternity
and/or support are recognized and can be enforced in Germany or, if no
judgment exists, a standard URESA petition may be sent to the German
authorities who will seek to have a suitable order entered in Germany.
75
If the laws differ on the duty to support in minor respects, then reciproc-
ity is absent only for support orders based on those differences. 76
Although differences between foreign support laws and RURESA
exist, the laws are substantially similar, and accommodationis for the dif-
ferences can be made. Obligees who formerly had no practical method
of recovering support are now afforded a relatively quick and easy way of
obtaining and enforcing support orders.
The Constitutionality of RURESA
The Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act is the
law only of those states which have adopted it and is not a federal stat-
ute. Proponents of RURESA are always careful to note that it is consti-
tutional and, specifically, that it does not violate article 1, section 10,
clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution which states, "(n)o state shall, without
73 The bases for refusing to recognize a foreign judgment are:
1. if the courts of the State to which the foreign court belongs have no jurisdic-
tion according to German law;
2. if the unsuccessful defendant is a German who did not enter an appearance
in the suit unless the writ of summons commencing the proceedings was
served on him either in person in the State of the court concerned or as the
result of assistance afforded by German authorities;
3. if the judgment was passed to the detriment of a German party in derogation
of the (relevant provisions of the German law dealing with missing persons,
judicial presumption of death, etc.);
4. if the recognition of the judgment would be contra bonos mores or contrary to
the purpose of a German law;
5. if reciprocity is not guaranteed.
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 328(l)-(5), Translation, supra note 65, at 15.
74 Id. § 328(5).
75 Opinion of the Attorney General of North Carolina, Rufus Edmisten to Robert H.
Ward, Director of the Social Service Division of the North Carolina Department of Human
Resources (July 31, 1979).
76 Id.
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the consent of Congress . . . enter any Agreement or Compact with an-
other State or with a foreign power." Although other possible grounds
for unconstitutionality exist, such as interference with Congress' power to
make federal policy or federal preemption of the area, this one clause has
been the focus of academic comment on the constitutionality of URESA
and similar laws. 77 The U.S. Supreme Court has never addressed the
constitutionality of RURESA, although it has rendered decisions in cases
involving reciprocal legislation, so the question of the constitutionality of
RURESA remains. 78
Two issues emerge in considering whether a statute is constitutional
under clause 3: 1) what are the meanings of the terms "agreement" and
"compact" as used in clause 3; and 2) does the statute constitute such an
agreement or compact which requires the consent of Congress to be
valid. If the second issue is answered in the negative, the question of
status of the reciprocal legislation arises. The resolution of the first two
issues will be explored by examining the views of U.S. legal commenta-
tors on the meaning of clause 3 in general and specifically as it relates to
RURESA. Opinions of both U.S. and Canadian courts will be analyzed
to determine the judicial view of RURESA's constitutional status.
The first issue is whether RURESA is an agreement or compact
within the meaning of clause 3. 79 Bouvier's Law Dictionary includes
compact within the definition of agreement.8 0 Additionally, it should be
kept in mind that the use of the word "agreement" by the courts, legal
commentators, and the officers of the state does not necessarily imply
that the Act is an agreement within the meaning of clause 3.
Several factors have been isolated as determinative of whether an
arrangement is an agreement within the meaning of clause 3. The first of
these factors is whether the provisions of the arrangement are binding on
the parties. In discussing the legal effect of agreements between Cana-
dian Provinces and American states, Di Marzo has concluded that reci-
procity of enforcement of support orders does not constitute an agree-
ment since the "orders are akin to unilateral acts and, although binding
on the party making them, they do not seem to involve the recognition of
77 See generally, C. OKEKE, CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1974);
Curtis, The Treaty Power and Family Law, 7 GA. L. REV. 55 (1972); Di Marzo, The Legal Status of
Agreements Concluded by Component Units of Federal States with Foreign Entities, 16 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L.
197 (1978); Naujoks, Compacts and.Agreements between States and between States and a Foreign Power, 36
MARQ. L. REV. 219 (1952); Rodgers, The Capaci't of States of the Union to Conclude International
Agreements.. The Background and Some Recent Developments, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 1021 (1967).
78 See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 516-17
(1947); Gorun v. Fall, 287 F. Supp. 725 (D. Mont. 1968), aj'd, 393 U.S. 398 (1969).
79 The U.S. Senate published a report of a study of the Constitution which concluded:
The terms "compact" and "agreement" ... do not apply to every possible com-
pact or agreement . . . but the prohibition is directed to the formation of any
combination tending to increase of political power in the States which may en-
croach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.
S. Doc. No. 232, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 366, 368 (quoted in Rodgers, supra note 77, at 1024).
80 BOUVIER'S LAw DICTIONARY 571 (3d rev. ed. 1914).
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mutual rights and obligations which is a precondition for the existence of
an agreement.""' Although the state and foreign entity may conduct
extensive negotiations and exchange of correspondence, the result is the
enactment of legislation or a declaration of reciprocity at the option of
the officials of the jurisdiction. It is not the prior negotiations which cre-
ate rights in the other party, but the terms of the state legislation. Either
state can amend its legislation at any time without restraint or recourse
by the other party, thereby destroying reciprocity of enforcement of sup-
port orders. The amendment of the legislation violates no agreement
and gives rise to no remedy. The enactment of reciprocal acts, however,
has been termed by one commentator as "[t]he making of a compact by
the method of reciprocal legislation" 8 2 which is subject to the consent of
Congress.
The second issue, whether URESA is a compact which is void due
to lack of consent of Congress, was advanced by the defendant in B/ouin V.
Dembitz8 3 in the court for the Southern District of New York. The New
York statute involved allowed the New York Family Court to enforce
orders against respondents present in New York in support proceedings
which had been initiated in Canada. The court rejected the defendant's
contention that this constituted a compact between a state and foreign
entity within the prohibition of the Constitution. Although the court
stated the reciprocal legislation was "not a compact with a foreign coun-
try,"8' 4 it did not give any explanation for its conclusion. The case was
appealed, but the constitutionality of the statute was not discussed by the
appellate court.8 5
The importance of the non-binding nature of the reciprocal legisla-
tion has been stressed as a factor which makes clause 3 inapplicable to
URESA. The establishment of reciprocity of enforcement of support or-
ders is seen as a symbolic act in an area of little interest to the federal
government. Additionally, the legislation is not a contract which binds
the state from rescinding or amending it, and further, RURESA would
be subject to preemption by any action of the federal government within
the area of concern. As one Canadian commentator stated, "the essence
of such agreements is that they rest on good will, and mutual, reciprocal
benefit, for their effectiveness: one does not go to law over them."8a6
The Canadian Supreme Court adopted this view in Ontario v. Scott,87
a case involving an attack on Ontario's Reciprocal Enforcement of
81 Di Marzo, supra note 77, at 206.
82 Naujoks, supra note 77, at 236 (quoting Dodd, Interstate Compacts, 70 U.S.L. REv. 557
(1936)).
83 367 F. Supp. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
84 id. at 417.
85 Blouin v. Dembitz, 489 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1973).
86 Di Marzo, supra note 77, at 211 (quoting McWhinney, The Consittutional Competence
within Federal Systems for International Agreements, in ONTARIO ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CON-
FEDERATION 154 (1967)).
87 [1956] Can. S. Ct. 137.
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Maintenance Orders Act (REMOA). Although of no legal precedent in
the United States, this case is of interest since the Canadian reciprocal
support legislation is substantially similar to RURESA and the issues
discussed by the Canadian Supreme Court are basically the same as
those under consideration. The issue before the Canadian Supreme
Court was whether REMOA was illegal since it involved matters of in-
ternational comity and treaty, matters traditionally reserved for the Par-
liament.""
In Scott, the petitioner had instituted proceedings under REMOA in
England and sought to enforce an order of support against the respon-
dent present in Ontario. The respondent moved that the action be dis-
missed on the grounds that REMOA was ultra vires. The trial court
denied the motion, but the court of appeals reversed, stating that
REMOA was ultra vires since it was an improper delegation of legislative
authority to the court and outside the jurisdiction of the legislature since
it delegated authority to an inferior court. The Canadian Supreme
Court upheld the decision of the trial court, holding that the legislation
was valid.8 9
In rejecting the respondent's argument that REMOA concerned the
parliamentary matters of international comity and treaty, the court
noted that the essential element of a treaty, its binding nature, was ab-
sent. The court explained that "[tihe enactments of the two legislatures
are complementary but voluntary; the application of each is dependent
on that of the other: each is the condition of the other; but that condi-
tion possesses nothing binding to its continuance. '"90 The court viewed
the arrangement as a method of extending the powers of the Canadian
courts in adducing evidence by allowing the courts of England to take
depositions which, along with the magistrate's statement, would be used
as evidence in the Ontario proceedings. Noting that the procedure in-
volved a Canadian statute, court, and respondent, the court found the
utilization of REMOA was within the power of the Canadian prov-
inces. 91
The court in Ontario v. Scott also discussed a second reason which is
often proferred in arguing that reciprocal support agreements are not
unconstitutional: the subject matter involved is outside the concern of
the federal government and thus implicitly excluded by clause 3.92 The
court stated, "[n]o other part of the country nor any other of the several
governments has the slightest interest in such a controversy and it con-
cerns ultimately property, actual or potential, within Ontario in a local
sense." 93 An American writer has noted a tradition in the United States
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 142 (Rand, J.).
91 Id. at 141 (Rand, J.), 150-54 (Locke, J.).
92 See Naujoks, supra note 77, at 235; Rodgers, supra note 77, at 1023.
93 [1956] Can. S. Ct. at 141 (Rand, J.).
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of recognizing domestic relations as an area reserved for state regula-
tion.94 Geographical strictures involved in domestic relations are empha-
sized, and "[o]nly in rare instances do family law matters acquire
international significance." 95 Under this theory, clause 3 would not in-
validate international arrangements entered into by states within the
limitation that the subject matter be of purely local concern.
An analogy can be drawn between this theory as applied to URESA
and U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the area of reciprocity of inheri-
tance laws between a state and a foreign entity. The leading Supreme
Court case, Clark v. Allen ,96 involved a California statute97 which allowed
a nonresident alien to inherit personal property from a decedent who
had resided in California. A treaty to which the United States was a
party existed governing the inheritance of real property by nonresident
aliens. The plaintiff alleged that the statute impermissibly intruded into
the field of foreign affairs since the right of inheritance by the nonresi-
dent alien depended on the right of the California resident to inherit
under the foreign law.98 Labelling this argument "farfetched," 99 the
Court noted that inheritance laws are local matters in which state policy
yields 6 nly to an established conflicting federal policy. The Court specif-
ically stated that reciprocal inheritance legislation did not constitute ne-
gotiation or a compact with a foreign country. Although the Court
recognized that the California statutes would have "some incidental or
direct effect in foreign countries," 100 it stated that this was also true of
other state laws whose constitutionality was unquestioned.10 '
The Court again examined the question of the constitutionality of
'reciprocal inheritance laws with regard to an Oregon statute in Zschernig
v. Miller,10 2 this time finding the statute unconstitutional. 10 3 The facts in
Zschermg, however, distinguish it from the principle promulgated in
Clark. The Oregon statute provided that a nonresident alien could in-
herit from an Oregon decedent if reciprocal rights were given to U.S.
citizens.' 0 4 Unlike the California statute involved in Clark, however, the
Oregon statute as applied allowed the courts, in determining whether the
nonresident alien could inherit the property, to decide as a precondition
if the nonresident alien would actually receive the property or whether it
would be confiscated by the foreign government. 0 5 The Court foresaw
94 Curtis, supra note 77, at 76.
95 Id. at 85-86.
96 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
97 CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 1956) (repealed 1974).
98 331 U.S. at 516.
99 Id. at 517.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
103 Id. at 432.
104 1951 Or. Laws ch. 519, § I (OR. REV. STAT. § 111.070) (repealed 1969).
105 389 U.S. at 434-35.
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in this situation potential for an impermissible effect on matters involv-
ing international politics and diplomacy. The conflict with these areas of
federal concern was held to outweigh the state's interest in the regulation
or distribution of property of its residents and the statute was declared
unconstitutional. Thus, the statute was unconstitutional not because it
was an agreement or compact within the meaning of clause 3, but be-
cause it invaded Congress' control of foreign policy.' 0 6
In discussing Clark and Zscherm'g, the court for the District of Mon-
tana noted that reciprocal inheritance laws were not unconstitutional per
se and devised a test drawn from the two cases which is equally applica-
ble to the URESA legislation. 0 7 As simply stated by the district court,
"if a state reciprocal statute requires that state courts do no more than
read the law of a foreign nation to determine whether reciprocity exists,
then the law does not infringe upon the prerogatives of the federal gov-
ernment."' 08 Thus, the test of the constitutionality of the reciprocal leg-
islation assumes there is no agreement within the meaning of clause 3
and looks instead to whether reciprocity rests on the express terms of the
foreign legislation or on the court's analysis of factors involving foreign
policy.
Addressing the two issues outlined in the beginning of this section,
the first issue can be answered that the terms "agreement" and "com-
pact" as used in clause 3 mean an agreement or compact with a foreign
entity which is either 1) of a binding nature over the parties involved, or
2) concerned with an area of foreign policy reserved to the federal gov-
ernment. The second issue, whether such an agreement or compact re-
quires the consent of Congress to be valid, can be answered in the
negative since the URESA legislation is not enforceable against the enti-
ties involved, is subject to change by the unilateral act of either, and
concerns the subject of domestic relations, long recognized as an area of
state interest and control. This conclusion leaves the question of the ef-
fect and status of the URESA to be resolved.
As previously discussed, the negotiations and resulting arrangements
between entities such as the State of North Carolina and West Germany
are not binding agreements or treaties.10 9 Despite the often extensive
correspondence, international travel, and discussion preceding the decla-
ration of reciprocity, the URESA rises no higher than the status of any
other state law." l0 It gives rights to certain citizens of foreign countries
which may be taken away arbitrarily by the act of either party. For
example, North Carolina could amend its definition of "state" in section
3(13) of the North Carolina General Statutes to exclude residents of for-
eign jurisdictions from its effect entirely. On the other hand, West Ger-
106 Id. at 441.
107 Gouin v. Fall, 287 F. Supp. 725 (D. Mont. 1968).
108 Id. at 728.
109 See text accompanying notes 77-108 supra.
1 10 See Di Marzo, supra note 77, at 206.
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many could amend its laws so drastically it would effectively destroy
rights of North Carolina residents to enforce support orders in West Ger-
many. In that event, however, West Germany would be placed outside
the current definition of "state" because it would be a nonreciprocating
jurisdiction. Therefore, URESA is a state law which is concerned with
international matters but is within the constitutional limits outlined by
the Supreme Court in analogous cases.
Conclusion
The Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act is an
important tool in the process of obtaining and enforcing support orders.
The RURESA gives validity to foreign orders by statute and provides
obligees outside the jurisdiction with a means of obtaining and enforcing
orders inexpensively. By establishing procedures and the personnel to
implement them, RURESA represents the only practical remedy open to
obligees attempting to reach an obligor outside the country. Reciprocity
of support laws is the key factor although there may be minor differences
in the laws of different countries which must be overcome. North Caro-
lina's arrangements with West Germany and Ontario, Canada illustrate
some of the differences existing between RURESA and the support laws
of foreign jurisdictions interested in reciprocity.
Although RURESA's provisions regarding international enforce-
ment of support orders were adopted in 1969, questions as to the consti-
tutionality of the reciprocal agreements entered into between states and
foreign countries still exist. Until the Supreme Court directly addresses
the issue of RURESA's constitutionality, the debate surrounding states
enacting these reciprocal arragements will continue. It appears, how-
ever, that such state legislation, which constitutes merely a working rela-
tionship and not a binding contract, would be upheld despite the
absence of congressional consent.
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